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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STA~E OF CALIFORNIA 
, 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
KATHLEEN SPIEGELMAN, LASC Case No: 18STCV05378 
v. 
YELP, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
Defendants. 
COURT'S FINAL RULING AND ORDER 
RE: DEFENDANT'S ANTI-SLAPP 
MOTION 
Hearing Date: December 10,2019 
I. BACKGROUND 
On November 16, 2018, Plaintiffs Kathleen Spiegelman, Gary Gagossian, and 
Dudley Danoff, MD, (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed this action against Defendant Yelp, Inc. 
Plaintiffs' operative First Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant unlawfully used the names, 
photographs, and likenesses of Plaintiffs, thereby violating their California constitutional rights 0 
privacy, California common law rights to one' s name and likeness, California Civil Code § 3344, 
and California Business and Professions Code § 17200 (UCL). Defendant specially moves to strike 
all four causes of action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. 
The Court heard argument and took the matter under submission. 
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II. DISCUSSION 
A. Legal Standard. 
"A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance 0 
the person ' s right of petition or free speech ... in connection with a public issue shall be subject 
to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there 
is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(I). 
Protected activity includes: "( I) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, 
executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any 
written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review 
by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) 
any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in 
connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise 
of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a 
public issue or an issue of public interest." /d. at § 425. J6(e); see Equilon Enterprises v. Consume 
ClIu.ve, Inc. , 29 Cal. 4th 53, 66 (2002). 
Thus, the Court undertakes a two-step analysis: First, the Court must determine "whether 
the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one 'arising 
from' protected activity." City of Cotati V. Caslmul/l, 29 Cal. 4th 69, 76 (2002). If such a showing 
has been made, the Court must then "consider whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability 
of prevailing on the claim." Id. When ruling on a special motion to strike, the Court must "conside 
the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or 
defense is based." Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(2). 
B. Plaintiffs' Causes of Action Arise from Yelp's Protected Activity. 
" (T)he arising from requirement is not always easily met." Equilon Enterprises. 29 Cal. 
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4th at 66. "In short, the statutory phrase 'cause of action ... arising from ' means simply that the 
defendant ' s act underlying the plaintiff's cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance 
of the right of petition or free speech." City of Cotati, 29 Cal. 4th at 78. "In the anti-SLAPP context, 
the critical point is whether the plaintiff's cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance 
of the defendant's right of petition or free speech." [d. 
Defendant contends that its posting of some of Plaintiffs' business information on it· 
website constitutes "writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection 
with an issue of public interest," Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(3). First, statements and information 
posted on Defendant ' s website "are accessible to anyone who chooses to visit ... [and] hardly 
could be more public." Wilbanks v. Wo/k, 121 Cal. App. 4th 883, 895 (2004); accord Barrett v. 
Rosellfila/, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 41, fn. 4 (2006). Thus, the public forum requirement is indisputably 
established. 
"Of course, not all statements made in a public forum, and not all conduct in furtherance 
of the rights of petition or free speech, fall under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) .... " Wilballks, 
121 Cal. App. 4th at 898. Rather, only those statement made " in connection with an issue of public 
interest," Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(3), are protected. "The most commonly articulated 
definitions of "statements made in connection with a public issue" focus on whether (I) the subject 
of the statement or activity precipitating the claim was a person or entity in the public eye; (2) the 
statement or activity precipitating the claim involved conduct that could affect large numbers 0 
people beyond the direct participants; and (3) whether the statement or activity precipitating the 
claim involved a topic of widespread public interest." 121 Cal. App. 4th at 898. "As to the latter, 
it is not enough that the statement refer to a subject of widespread public interest; the statement 
must in some manner itself contribute to the public debate." [d. 
Here, the pleadings and evidence indicate that the statements and activity Plaintiffs seek to 
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hold Defendant liable for is the hosting of webpages for Plaintiffs' businesses (despite thei 
protestations), see, e.g., First Amended Comp1.113; MacBean Decl. '121, and posting of certain 
information, including basic business information and photos provided by third parties, see 
MacBean Decl. 'lI'1 4- 12, 14. Accordingly, the gravamen of Plaintiffs' claims revolves around 
and arises from- Defendant's decision to create and host pages for Plaintiffs' businesses without 
their consent. See First Amended Compl. '1'146, 59, 67. Thus, Defendant' s activity can be fairly 
characterized as creating a forum and platform for members of the public to discuss Plaintiffs' 
businesses and compare alternatives in a meaningful manner. Mac Bean Decl. 'I 4-12. While 
Defendant offers no dispositive, controlling case on this issue, its cited caselaw is nonetheless 
illuminating. 
First, Defendant cites to Wilbanks v. Walk, 121 Cal. App. 4th 883, 888-89 (2004). In that 
case, the Court of Appeal held that a defendant's statements about the plaintiff-brokers' 
purportedly unethical business practices constituted consumer protection information that was 
"directly connected to an issue of public concern." [d. at 900. Although not the direct target 0 
Plaintiffs' claims, Defendants' activity here boils down to the creation of a forum for hosting 
consumer reviews of Plaintiffs' (and other) businesses, MacBean Dec!. 'lI 5. These reviews 
indisputably contribute to the public debate and help consumers make informed decisions about 
where they should spend their money. Thus, while some of the content on Defendant's hosted 
pages consists of unprotected business information (e.g. address, business name, phone number) 
and photos, much of Defendant's activity relates to issues of public concern. 
Moreover, while Defendant's decision to create the pages and broadcast them to a large 
audience is not alone sufficient to satisfy the public interest requirement, since "a publication does 
not become connected with an issue in the public interest simply because it is widely 
disseminated," Wilbanks, 121 Cal. App. 4th at 900, Plaintiffs ' decisions to participate in the free 
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market under organized corporate forms and advertise themselves in various media, see First 
Amended Compl. '144, 57, 66, supports the conclusion that Defendant's activity relates to a public 
issue. Ultimately, it is this protected activity that Plaintiffs' claims arise from (i.e. they constitute 
the allegedly improper use of Plaintiffs' likenesses- an essential element of Plaintiffs' claims). 
In their opposition and at oral argument, Plaintiffs contentiously disputed the applicability 
of Stewart v. Rolling Stolle LLC, 181 Cal. App. 4th 664 (2010), and the Court's tentative 
conclusion that Defendant's speech cannot be considered unprotected commercial speech because 
protected content is not "deemed transformed into commercial speech merely because of its 
proximity to advertisements touching on the same subject matter." [d. at 687. In chief, Plaintiffs 
argue that this case is distinguishable because: (I) Defendant advertises competitors in the same 
industry; and (2) Defendant makes statements on Plaintiffs' pages (e.g. listing "Recommended 
Reviews," etc.). See, e.g., Yacoubian Decl. '19, Ex. C, 44:7-25. Neither point is persuasive. 
First, it does not matter that Defendant advertises competitors and related businesses. A 
topical nexus with an advertisement alone is insufficient to constitute a use of someone's image. 
See Stewart, 181 Cal. App. 4th at 686-87 ("In fact, the only nexus between the ad and the Feature 
is the mutual references to independent music."). Rather, the relevant inquiry in determining 
whether the speech (i.e. the particular Yelp pages and their alleged use of Plaintiffs' likenesses in 
connection with advertisements) constitutes unprotected commercial speech revolves around 
whether Plaintiffs' likenesses are incorporated in the advertisements. See id. at 687 ("This 
distinguishes the present case from [Downillg v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th 
Cir. 200 I)], wherein the photograph of the surfers was explicitly used to market replicas of the 
same T-shirts that the surfers were wearing."). Here, the record is clear that "[n]one of the 
[Plaintiffs ' likenesses] appear in the [advertisements for their competitors]," id. 
Second, none of the "statements" (i.e. the uniform text consistent across Yelp pages that 
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identifies the pages' different sections, such as reviews, advertisements, etc.) posted by Defendant 
that are at issue in this lawsuit are sufficient to bring their conduct within the ambit of commercial 
speech and Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17(c). J It is on this point that Plaintiffs' use 0 
Demetriades v. Yelp. Inc., 228 Cal. App. 4th 294 (2014), is unpersuasive . In that case, the Court 
of Appeal held that Yelp's complained of activity fell within Code of Civil Procedure section 
425. 17(c) because "Yelp' s statements about its review filter-a~ opposed to the content of the 
reviews themselves-are commercial speech about the quality of its product (the reliability of its 
review filter) intended to reach third parties to induce them to engage in a commercial transaction 
(patronizing Yelp's Web site, which patronage induces businesses on Yelp to purchase 
advertising)." ld. at 310. Here, however, Yelp has made no representations about itself, its 
products, or its services. Any text Yelp "created" on Plaintiffs ' pages consists solely of barebones 
descriptors and headings designed to direct the users of its website. None of the language Plaintiffs 
point to consists of any affirmative representation that confers a commercial benefit on Yelp. Thus, 
Demetriades does not help Plaintiffs here. 
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims arise from Defendant's protected activity. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs must show that an exception applies or demonstrate a probability of success 
on the merits to survive Defendant's motion. 
C. No Exception Applies. 
Plaintiffs' contend that the public interest exception applies here. Code of Civil Procedure 
section 425. 17(b) provides that "any action brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the 
general public ... " is not subject to a special motion to strike, provided certain criteria are mel. 
J Plaintiffs' appear to characterize their claims as ones arising from the allegedly unfair business 
practice of Yelp offering Plaintiffs the opportunity to "buyout" advertising space on their 
business's pages that they did not consent to the creation of, but the operative complaint cannot be 
read-in any manner whatsoever-as advancing such a claim. Thus, this unpleaded claim- and 
the other claims Plaintiffs' contend they would seek leave to add to their complaint-<:annot save 
them here. Rather, the Court must analyze Plaintiffs' complaint as it stands. 
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Accord Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc., 123 Cal. App. 4th 903, 913-14 (2004). To be exempt: (I) the 
plaintiff must "not seek any relief greater than or different from the relief sought for the general 
public or a class of which the plaintiff is a member," Civ. Proc. Code § 425.17(b)( I), not including 
any "claim for attorney's fees, costs, or penalties ... ," id.; (2) "[t]he action, if successful, would 
enforce an important right affecting the public interest, and would confer a significant benefit, 
whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, on the general public or a large class of persons," id. at § 
425.17(b)(2); and (3) "[p]rivate enforcement is necessary and places a disproportionate financial 
burden on the plaintiff in relation to the plaintiff's stake in the matter." Id. at § 425.17(b)(3) 
In Blanchard v. DIRECTV, IIIC., 123 Cal. App. 4th 903 (2004), the Court of Appeal held 
that a putative UCL class action comprised of individuals who owned devices capable of pirating 
DIRECTV satellite streams and received demand letters from DIRECTV did not meet the 
requirements of Code of Civil Procedures section 425.17(b)(2)-(3). With respect to the second 
element, the Court of Appeal held that plaintiffs there would not be enforcing an important public 
right because "plaintiffs want to enjoin DIRECTV from sending this particular demand letter 
concerning this specific electronic device to users of this device." Id. at 914-15. The Court noted 
that plaintiffs were "not seeking to assert some general right not to receive demand letters or 
notices[. n]or d[id] they seek a declaration about demand letters in general." Id. at 915. Thus, the 
Court of Appeal concluded that "[n]otwithstanding the number of the recipients of the letters rank 
in the thousands, there is no public interest principle being vindicated by this action." Id. 
With respect to "the third element, the so-called necessity and financial burden factor," id., 
the Court of Appeal held that plaintiffs failed to meet that element because their "UCL claim [wa]s 
entirely personal to them." Id. at 916. The Court of Appeal observed that plaintiffs sought "an 
accounting to them and restitution to them of moneys they paid to DIRECTV." Id. 
Here, without analyzing the first two elements, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fail the third. 
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Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent consist only of business owners with the requisite 
fame and notoriety to have their names and likenesses meaningfully appropriated-a narrow group 
that could hardly be considered representative of the general public. Plaintiffs and the class seek 
the greater of their actual damages or statutory damages of $750 per misappropriation, as well as 
punitive damages and injunctive relief limiting Defendant's ability to publish and host content, in 
their prayer for relief. See First Amended Compl.; Civ. Code § 3344(a). Thus, the general public, 
aside from receiving little to no pecuniary benefit from this litigation, would potentially be harmed 
by the injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek since the public forum that Defendant provides to the public 
would be substantially limited. Accordingly, the Court finds that "the benefits that would be 
conferred on [p]laintiffs, if they were victorious in this lawsuit, far transcend any conceivable 
benefit to the general public." Blanchard, 123 Cal. App. 4th at 916. 
Therefore, the public interest exception in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17(b) does 
not apply to Plaintiffs' claims here. 
D. Plaintiffs Have Demonstrated a Probability of Success on the Merits. 
Because Defendant has shown that all four of Plaintiffs' causes of action arise from 
protected activity, Plaintiff has the burden of establishing a probability of success on the merits 
with respect to those claims. Cotati, 29 Cal.4th at 76. Plaintiffs cannot do so here. 
Plaintiffs' first three causes of action are for statutory, common law, and derivative UCL 
claims for alleged violations of the right of publicity. These claims generally have "four elements: 
(I) defendant's use of plaintiff's identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness to 
defendant's advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury." 
Cross II. Facebook,lnc., 14 Cal. App. 5th 190,208 (2017); see Civ. Code § 3344. 
Here, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Defendant used their identities for commercial, 
advertising, or sales purposes. The Court finds Cross II. Facebook, Inc., 14 Cal. App. 5th 190 
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(2017), to be dispositive on this point. There, the Court of Appeal held that allowing "unrelated 
third party advertisements to run adjacent to pages containing users' comments about [plaintiffs] 
and [their] business practices ... [wa]s insufficient," id. at 211, to constitute misappropriation 0 
name or likeness. Here, while ads for similar businesses were displayed on-and next to 
Plaintiffs' Yelp pages, Plaintiffs' names and likeness do not appear "in the ads themselves," id. at 
209. Thus, Plaintiffs ' right of publicity claims necessarily fail. 
Plaintiffs' also fail to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits with respect to 
their fourth cause of action for violation of their rights to privacy. As Defendant notes, Plaintiffs 
cannot have an expectation of privacy in the registered names of their businesses, which are matters 
of public record. See Gates v. Discovery Commullicatiolls, Inc., 34 Cal. 4th 679, 696 (2004). Nor 
can Plaintiffs have privacy interests in photos and information that they posted to Defendant's 
publicly accessible website. See Moreno v. Hallford Sentinel. Inc., 172 Cal. App. 4th 1125, 1130-
31 (2009) . 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant'S special motion to strike under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 425.16 is GRANTED. 
Dated: February 5, 2020 
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